Sovereign Immunity in Texas
Here is some of the law in Texas regarding sovereign immunity (specifically as it applies to car accidents with government employees) which is the doctrine that says the government is immune from lawsuits except in certain narrow circumstances:
Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity protects the State of Texas against lawsuits for damages unless the State consents to be sued. Gulf Coast Ctr. v. Curry, 658 S.W.3d 281, 283 (Tex. 2022). Governmental immunity provides similar protection to subdivisions of the State, like cities. See Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). “Governmental immunity has two components: immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which bars suit against the entity altogether.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006) (footnote omitted). Governmental immunity from suit deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004).
Governmental units are immune from suit unless immunity is waived by state law. City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2022). The City, as a political subdivision of the State, cannot be vicariously liable for the actions of its employees unless its governmental immunity has been waived by the state legislature. See City of Hous. v. Vogel, No. 01-22-00071-CV, 2022 WL 16756378, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Sovereign Immunity for Car Accidents
The TTCA creates a limited waiver of governmental immunity for claims of personal injury or property damage proximately caused by a governmental employee’s negligent use or operation of a motor-driven vehicle, so long as the employee would be liable personally. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1); see id. § 101.025(a) (“Sovereign immunity to suit is waived and abolished to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”).
Exceptions to the Exceptions
The TTCA also provides several exceptions and exclusions that retain immunity even if immunity would otherwise be waived by another provision, such as section 101.021. See id. §§ 101.051-.067 (“Exclusions and Exceptions”); see Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 867 (Tex. 2023)
(“The [TTCA] may waive immunity in one breath and in the next take back part of the waiver.”); Delaney v. Univ. of Hous., 835 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1992) (noting that such exceptions are not “prohibition[s] of certain actions against the government,” but “exception[s] to the limited waiver of immunity brought about by the [TTCA]”). If an exclusion or exception applies, then TTCA section 101.021 “does not waive the City’s immunity from those claims regardless of whether they would otherwise fall within the scope of that waiver.” Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 529; City of Hous. v. Davis, No. 01-13-00600-CV, 2014 WL 1678907, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“When the exception applies, the [TTCA] is unavailable as a waiver of immunity even if the facts otherwise fall within . . . Section 101.021.”).
The emergency exception provides that the TTCA does not apply to a claim arising
from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others[.]
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.055(2).
The 9-1-1 exception provides that the TTCA
applies to a claim against a public agency that arises from an action of an employee of the public agency . . . and that involves . . . responding to a 9-1-1 emergency call only if the action violates a statute or ordinance applicable to the action.
Id. § 101.062(b).
The plaintiff (person bringing the suit) has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction, which “encompasses the burden of establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity in suits against the government.” Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019); see Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 866 (explaining that plaintiff must first allege “circumstances that fit within a provision of the [TTCA] that authorizes a waiver” because “[t]he starting point is always the status quo: a presumption against any waiver until the plaintiff establishes otherwise”). “As a general matter, a plaintiff initially discharges this burden by alleging facts that bring a claim within the waiver.” Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 867. However, “being ‘within’ the waiver entails both key parts described above: satisfying the provisions that clearly and affirmatively waive immunity and negating any provisions that create exceptions to, and thus withdraw, that waiver.” Id.